In this post I'll discuss Daniel Dennett's idea that natural selection was the greatest idea of all time. (We might call this Dennett's bad idea.)
Quotes;
A. In an article called Darwin’s “Strange Inversion of Reasoning” Daniel Dennett began by claiming that the “scientist who made the greatest contribution to philosophy is Charles Darwin.” He continued with something he has said often, “If I could give a prize for the single best idea anyone ever had, I’d give it to Darwin.” [1.]
- What idea would that be? Charlie Darwin certainly didn't come up with natural selection. [Edward Blyth discussed the idea long before Darwin 'borrowed' it. I guess it was considered a privilege of the elite to steal from the lower classes at that time.]
B. "In a single stroke Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection united the realm of physics and mechanism on the one hand with the realm of meaning and purpose on the other.
- No; Darwin attempted (may have attempted) to do this, but he didn't succeed. There's an unpassable chasm between mere matter and meaning. (Dennett knows this, but he's thrown honesty out the window long ago.) There is no way you can get from 'physics' (the motions of matter) to meaning in a material universe. This so called greatest idea in all history is unfortunately utterly fallacious. (Don't great ideas have to be true? Or doesn't that matter any more?)
- Dennett's claim should be rejected. There can't be meaning or purpose in a universe of mere matter. (And he's well aware of this.) All that would exist in such a universe (and this is Not such a universe) is matter in motion; operating in terms of cause and effect, motion and reaction operating in terms of chemistry and physics. Meaning and purpose require freedom; they involve personal agents engaging in goal directed behavior that wouldn't occur in a universe of matter. Meaning and purpose involve a personal agent transcending physical law. (Matter can't transcend itself..)
- The problem (for materialism) that Dennett claims C. Darwin solved, instead remains for materialists like himself a fatal flaw in their worldview. There is an unbridgeable chasm between fact (matter) and value (meaning). Darwin didn't solve it, and in my opinion it can't be solved.
C. "From a Darwinian perspective the continuity between lifeless matter on the one hand and living things and all their activities and products on the other can be glimpsed in outline and explored in detail, not just the strivings of animals and the efficient designs of plants, but human meanings and purposes: art and science itself, and even morality."
- Dennett is well aware that matter can't produce complex (specified) information, but he pretends otherwise. According to his writings everything in human culture came from the rocks by some mysterious process called evolution. There isn't any way this could happen. (This amounts to saying that if you subject a rock to entropy decay you will inevitably end up with an Einstein or a Pascal.) He speaks of a continuity between non-life and life but he knows that no such continuity exists.
- If there is a continuity between lifeless matter and living organisms this means atoms and electrons are living entities. (This amounts to the contradiction of saying non-living things are alive.) This the ancient view known as hylozoism. [2.] We see elements of panpsychism as well. [3.]
D. "Such an appeal to the power of natural selection to design highly reliable information-gathering organs would be in danger of vicious circularity were it not for the striking confirmations of these achievements of natural selection using independent engineering measures. ''
- Here Dennett doesn't address creationist critiques (what's new, they never do) but simply assumes evolution is true. He looks around and sees a world of exquisitely designed organs and says, ''see, look at the wonders natural selection can design.'' He doesn't account for how matter (non-intelligent, non-teleological) can produce complex information... he just assumes it. (Reifying natural selection in the process.) I can't respect this kind of evasion. All he's done is to say, ''evolution is true because everywhere we look we see evidence of wonderful things designed by natural selection.'' Is he really this thick? Does he really imagine he's addressed the issue? (Personally I think he's merely working here as a good defense lawyer; offering the best defense he can of an obviously guilty client.)
- The argument isn't, "how can we trust our minds since they're just the products of mindless evolution?" but "how could we trust our minds IF we were just products of mindless evolution?" In addition, the question is not simply how one could trust one's mind on 'banal' matters of survival, but how one could trust one's philosophical thinking.
- Dennett plays a neat trick here when he uses certain basic impulses and organs (having to do with food and danger) and then claims, using these examples, that all human reasoning is sound. The facts are much starker. We could say (accepting for the moment the validity of his model) that the further away from the basic 'necessities' of life one gets, the less confidence one could have in human thinking. i.e. in areas such as speculations over origins (philosophy, etc.) which have no bearing on survival. There is no reason to believe the reasoning in those areas is sound, as it wouldn't impinge on survival. (This critique would obviously apply to defenses of Darwinian thinking and explanation.)
E. "The acuity of vision in the eagle and hearing in the owl, the discriminatory powers of electric eels and echolocating bats, and many other cognitive talents in humans and other species have all been objectively measured, for instance.''
- Let's ignore the fact his argument won't work. Even if it did the acuity of vision in the eagle has Nothing to do with the validity of human reasoning. (As someone who's studied logic Dennett knows this.) He's ignoring the human/animal distinction, as well as ignoring the chasm that exists between matter and human reason. (We might call this the mind/matter distinction.)
F. "It is undeniable that the other necessary competences of life are composable from unliving, uncomprehending parts; why should comprehension itself be the lone exception?''
- Why? I guess we could ask why not just as easily. He's trying to ignore the mind/matter distinction. I would think it's pretty obvious that minds can do a million and one things matter can't. Isn't that reason enough? What more do you want?
- Dennett is ignoring the obvious fact that it's not the matter that makes up a computer, but the arrangement of the matter. In other words, it's information that counts, not matter. Dennett knows this, but he's trying hard to pretend that he doesn't.
- Dennett is left with many problems he'd rather not discuss. A crucial one being how to get from non-life to life. (At times he speaks of a continuity, but then he also uses terms like unliving. Apparently he's confused as to how to put the pieces of his worldview together.)
G. "Is it “metaphorical” to attribute beliefs to birds or chimpanzees? Should we reserve that term, and many others, for (adult) human beings alone? This lexical dearth helps to sustain the illusion that there is an unbridgeable gulf between animal minds and human minds—despite the obvious fact that similar quandaries of interpretation afflict us when we turn to young children.''
- Here we have a masterpiece (albeit brief) of muddled thinking. (From an accomplished philosopher no less.)
He makes several serious errors here. He compares animals and human beings, and he compares adult humans with human children. As a philosopher he knows better. All these 'beings' belong in separate categories. He's deliberately confusing the issue by bringing children into the mix. (He knows very well that you define things by representatives of the mature form.)
- Is it metaphorical to attribute beliefs to birds? Yes. (I like these easy questions.) You can't mix instinct and belief. To have a belief you must have freedom. Animals don't believe things they do things. (Does anyone imagine animals wondering at the validity of metaphors in the reasoning process?) Although we see creationists accused continually of having strange ideas, we see here that evolutionists have strange ideas of their own. (e.g. not only do birds have beliefs, but electrons and particles are alive and have minds.)
H. "And our indefinitely extendable recursive power of reflection means that not only can we evaluate our progress, but we can evaluate our evaluation methods, and the grounds for relying on evaluation methods, and the grounds for thinking that this iterative process gives us grounds for believing the best fruits of our research, and so forth."
- Again, Dennett is just assuming evolution, not accounting for the world in terms of this mindless, goal-less process. To see what I mean, insert the word matter in this passage for the word our (ie. for the human.) If you do you get something like, ''matter can not only evaluate progress, matter can also evalutate evaluation methods, and the grounds for relying on evaluation methods...'' Which is to say, particles can evalutate evaluation methods...
- The problem here (that Dennett tries to dance around) is that materialism can't account for living organisms at all, let alone human beings. Since materialists can't solve this problem they just ignore it, and assume that 'life' somehow emerged from little warm ponds. It then built various cranes and pulled up philosophers out of the ground. It's a nice story, but I don't buy it. It has a small flaw... it's impossible.
I. "We have excellent internal evidence for believing that science in general is both reliable and a product of naturalistic forces only—natural selection of genes and natural selection of memes.
- Contra Dennett; we do Not have excellent evidence 'science' is product of naturalistic forces only. In fact we have no evidence of this. This is a claim with nothing to back it up. The idea that rocks (matter) can engage in scientific thinking is an absurdity. Again we have to ask the obvious question, ''where does all this information come from?" If Dennett is the product of an unbroken chain of mutations all the information in his being had to have been contained within that mythical first cell the Darwinists talk about. That is simply not believable.
J. “It took Darwin to discover that a mindless process created all those reasons.”
- Dennett wants us to believe that a mindless process created minds. He can believe that if he wants to, but I find it impossible to believe such a 'mindless' bit of speculation. I see this as a desperate attempt to escape the evidence of creation.
- A belief a rock will turn into a philosopher by decay and mutation is like trying to get a bigger and bigger number by endlessly subtracting.
Summary; what was the greatest idea of all time? It wasn't natural selection.
Notes;
1. Leading Darwinists Pool Their Speculations: Creation/Evolution Headlines 06/22/2009
June 22, 2009 — The Darwin Bicentennial continued this week with a series of articles in PNAS by leading Darwinists. The Sackler Colloquium, called “In the Light of Evolution III,” explored the history and impact of Darwin’s theory of evolution, and prospects for the future.
- The above is an excellent 'article' and well worth reading.
2. Hylozoism;
- [from Greek hyle, “matter”; zoe, “life”] - In philosophy, any system that views all matter as alive, either in itself or by participation in the operation of a world soul or some similar principle. Hylozoism is logically distinct both from early forms of animism, which personify nature, and from panpsychism, which attributes some form of consciousness or sensation to all…
- materialism and evolution require people believe all of matter is alive and has at least some measure of intelligence. this is one of the 'dirty secrets' of e. theory; something e's don't tell students about. Since e. requires a 'principle of continuity' all of life must be inherent in the basic stuff of the universe.
3. Panpsychism; (Gr. ray, all; Jivxn, soul)
'A philosophical term applied to any theory of nature which recognizes the existence of a psychical element throughout the objective world. In such theories not only animals and plants but even the smallest particles of matter are regarded as having some rudimentary kind of sensation or "soul," which plays the same part in relation to their objective activities or modifications as the soul does in the case of human beings. Such theories are the modern scientific or semi-scientific counterparts of the primitive animism of savage races, and may be compared with the hylozoism of the Greek physicists. In modern times the chief exponents of panpsychist views are Thomas Carlyle, Fechner and Paulsen: a similar idea lay at the root of the physical theories of the Stoics.' (Britannica)
4. I've questioned Dennett's honesty in this post. Some might think this is a rude thing to do. Maybe; the trouble is that so much of the writing on the subject of origins is replete with b.s. So what can you believe? I think you can believe a lot of the criticisms; on both sides. The claims are far harder to take seriously. One day I hope that people will take these criticisms (from both sides) and build a model of origins that's far superior to anything we have today.